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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The increase in public expenditure in developed countries during the last 
decades together with current difficulties in rising tax resources have made 
actions aimed at improving efficiency in the public sector a priority of economic 
policy. As a result, multiple studies evaluating the efficiency of the organisations 
providing public services have come out in both research and policy-making 
activities. Even, some countries, including Spain, have established agencies or 
bodies specifically devoted to evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of 
different public services. 
 
Most of these studies have focused on two main policies of the Welfare 
State: health and education, although other areas such as court administration, 
social services or local activities have also been assessed. However, literature 
devoted to the efficiency evaluation of public producers with an administrative 
nature is still scarce. The sole exceptions to this have been the studies 
attempting to measure the efficiency of tax offices (González and Miles, 2000; 
Moesen and Persoon, 2002; Forsund et al., 2005; and, Barros, 2007).  
 
This paper attempts to extend the literature about efficiency 
measurement in this specific field by focusing on the performance assessment 
of regional cadastral offices which had not been studied previously using this 
approach.  
 
The main reason for the lack of previous studies in this area has been 
the difficulty in obtaining data on the productive process. However, the Spanish 
General Directorate of Real Estate Cadastral Assessment (General Directorate 
hereafter) clearly defines objectives and has made an effort to collect relevant 
information about the processes undertaken by the units, which enables us to 
construct a function that can model the production technology in this context.  
 
In particular, we are able to perform our analysis because the General 
Directorate provided us with a high quality dataset containing information about 
the regional cadastral offices which operate in different regions for the period 
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2000-2005, which includes both indicators representing the results achieved 
and productive factors used in the process. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis performed comprises an additional advantage 
that arises from the inclusion of information about activities carried out by 
external public sector agents that collaborate with the cadastral offices through 
technical assistance contracts, since it allows evaluating the effect of this 
cooperation process on efficiency. 
 
The methodology used to analyse the performance of cadastral offices is 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This is one of the most widely used 
techniques in the public sector since it can be easily adapted to its particular 
characteristics of production such as the multiplicity of outputs, lack of 
information about production technology or the inexistence of prices. In 
particular, it is especially appropriate for measuring efficiency in relatively 
simple production processes where high quality data is available, a framework 
that takes place in our study. Moreover, multiple extensions have been 
developed within this technique in order to adapt it to different contexts and thus 
achieve high levels of accuracy in efficiency measures. These include the so-
called second-stage models which are especially useful in our case, since they 
allow us to identify exogenous factors associated with demographic or 
economic aspects that, despite playing no role in the productive process, may 
have a significant effect on the results.  
 
The study is structured as follows. The second section describes DEA 
and an extension to this method that makes possible to test the influence of 
external variables on results. The characteristics of the productive process in 
the cadastral offices are analysed in the third section and, subsequently, we 
describe the database used and the variables selected to perform the empirical 
analysis. The fourth section presents the results obtained by applying the 
techniques described in section two to the available sample. Finally, last section 
summarizes the main conclusions of the study. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Efficiency evaluation models are usually based on frontier analysis, in 
which the maximum achievable output is estimated considering the use of 
certain inputs and a given technology. As a result, the frontier function 
represents the maximum production level which serves as a reference to 
calculate the inefficiency of the other observed units. Given that the frontier 
cannot be observed in practice, it is normally calculated using the best practices 
observed among all the assessed units. 
 
The frontier function can be empirically estimated with alternative 
approaches which, in general, can be grouped into two categories: parametric 
and non-parametric techniques1. The former are characterised by the use of a 
predetermined functional form with constant parameters in order to construct 
the production function which is usually estimated using econometric methods. 
In contrast, the non-parametric approach does not require the imposition of a 
determined form on the production function. Instead, it is sufficient to define a 
set of formal properties which must satisfy the set of production factors. 
 
In general terms, it makes little sense to consider one of the above 
methods as superior, since both of them present its own shortcomings. 
Consequently, the characteristics of the sector under examination, together with 
restrictions on available information, must determine the most adequate option 
in each case. 
 
For the reasons explained in the introduction, non-parametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is particularly attractive for measuring efficiency in 
the public context and, specifically, for the subsector we are considering in this 
study. DEA was developed by Charnes, Copper and Rhodes (1978) from the 
basis of Farell’s (1957) seminal work in order to obtain efficiency scores that 
represent the performance of different production units comprising an 
organisation considering input and output indicators. DEA offers relative 
                                                 
1 See Lovell (1993) for an excellent discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of 
parametric and non-parametric techniques. 
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measures of efficiency, since each unit is compared to those with similar input 
and output values with the aim of determining whether it belongs to the frontier 
(if it is efficient) or not. In that case, the method allows identifying targets of 
production for each unit according to the values of its reference units. 
 
Formally, Data Envelopment Analysis establishes a mathematical 
programming problem for each unit and the resolution of this problem allows it 
to be assigned an efficiency score. The standard formulation of this programme 
can be viewed as a problem of optimisation subject to certain restrictions 
reflecting the activity of the other producers. This formulation may take several 
forms depending on whether an approach minimising inputs or maximising 
outputs is adopted, according to whether units are being evaluated in terms of 
their ability to reduce resource input consumption or improve results. If we 
consider a set of units n consuming m inputs and producing s outputs, the 
efficiency of a unit can be measured as follows: 
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where 0h  is the efficiency score (between 0 and 1); 0ry  denotes the quantity of 
output r produced by the unit; 0ix  is the quantity of input i consumed by the unit; 
ijrj xy ,  are the outputs and inputs of the unit j; and 0, ≥ri uv  are the weightings 
applied. The resolution of the programme allows obtaining the relevant 
weightings providing the best possible efficiency value for each producer. A 
unitary value implies that the observed and potential production are the same 
or, in other words, the producer is efficient. If the value is lower than one, the 
assessed unit is identified as inefficient since there are other units in the sample 
(those forming the reference group in the comparison) which perform better. 
5
 The DEA model described implicitly assumes constant returns to scale, 
which is a very restrictive assumption about the production technology. In other 
words, it assumes that any increase in inputs translates into a proportional 
increase in outputs, which excludes the possibility of inefficiency due to scale 
effects. This assumption can be relaxed with the inclusion of an additional 
restriction in the programme which allows variable returns to scale in production 
(Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984): ∑
=
=
n
j
j
1
1λ . Thus, inefficient units are 
compared solely with others operating on the same scale. As a result, the 
technique admits greater flexibility by allowing an analysis to be performed in 
those (very common) cases where the units under evaluation operate on a 
similar scale. 
 
Since 1978 a large literature on DEA has been developed in order to 
adapt it to different frameworks2. One of the fields in which there has been a 
significant evolution is referred to the treatment of factors beyond the control of 
the units under evaluation that can affect their performance - the so called 
environmental variables3. The option that has most widely been used in the 
literature for dealing with these variables is the second stage model4. This 
approach is based on calculating efficiency scores using an standard DEA in 
which the effect of environmental variables is not taken into account. This 
produces a first stage measure for production ( jθ ) that captures not only 
technical inefficiency but also the influence of variables that have not been 
included in the analysis. Subsequently, those scores are regressed on 
environmental variables (Zj):  
 
jjjj uZf += ),( βθ .  
 
                                                 
2 See Emrouznejad et al (2008) for an excellent review of the literature on DEA in the last thirty 
years. 
3 For a detailed review of the different methodological options for incorporating the impact of 
exogenous variables in efficiency analysis using non-parametric techniques, see Cordero et al. 
(2008). 
4 See Hoff (2007) for an excellent revision on this method. 
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The parameters of this regression are usually estimated using Tobit since 
the values of the dependent variable are censored (McCarty and Yaisawarng, 
1993)5. Those estimates enables us to identify those variables that have 
influence on efficiency scores as well as the sign of that effect (positive or 
negative).  
 
The main criticism of this approach has been that it does not comply with 
the assumption of the independency of errors, given that scores initially 
obtained using DEA include information on all units comprising the sample (Xue 
and Harker, 1999), with the result that the error term and vector Z are 
correlated. When the sample size is sufficiently large, the issue of error 
correlation disappears. However, the results obtained by drawing inferences 
from a small sample are invalid (Simar and Wilson, 2007).  
 
This problem can be solved by using bootstrap methods. In this sense, 
there have been different proposals to address the problem6, but the option that 
provides the most satisfactory solution is the methodology suggested by Simar 
and Wilson (2007). These authors describe a complete data generating process 
consistent with regression of non-parametric estimates in a second stage and develop 
two different algorithms based on the application of bootstrap methods to obtain 
consistent and unbiased estimates for the parameters of the regression independently 
of the sample size. This makes it possible to correctly identify the effect of those 
factors beyond the control of the units7.  
 
                                                 
5 However, McDonald (2009) support that estimation through ordinary least squares provides 
consistent estimates given that the efficiency scores calculated in the initial stage are fractional 
instead of censored values. 
6 Xue and Harker (1999) and Hirschberg and Lloyd (2002) also suggest methods to avoid the 
problem of correlation among DEA scores, but they both use a naive bootstrap which is 
inconsistent in the context of non-parametric efficiency estimation (Simar and Wilson 1999a and 
1999b). 
7 See Simar and Wilson (2007), pp. 41-43, for a detailed analysis of the content of these 
algorithms. 
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3. THE PRODUCTIVE PROCESS OF CADASTRAL OFFICES 
 
This section introduces the main characteristics of the cadastral offices 
production process. Afterwards, it describes the variables used in the empirical 
analysis and the database. 
 
3.1. Cadastral activity 
 
The legislation regulating real estate evaluation in Spain is the Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2004 which approves the Revised Text of the Law on Real 
Estate Evaluation. The first article of this regulation defines real estate cadastre 
as an administrative register in which rural and urban properties are described. 
More specifically, the third article establishes that this description must include 
their physical, economic and legal characteristics, i.e., the location, the 
cadastral reference, the cadastral value, the cadastral title-holder, the surface 
area, the construction quality and a graphical representation.  
 
These activities are carried out through different procedures, notably 
applications or declarations for inscription, deregistration or modification 
proposed by property owners, communications from notaries and city councils 
and the property value and inspection reports achieved by the General 
Directorate itself. 
 
The General Directorate is the office in charge of managing the 
Cadastre. The local nature of the Cadastre requires that the services have a 
clearly decentralised structure with management units located in every Spanish 
province. Despite the division of work between different administrative units, all 
of them are pursuing the same objectives which provides the rationale for our 
study. 
 
In the context of an efficiency evaluation in this framework, the catalogue 
of functions assigned to the cadastral offices are identified as the outputs or 
results of the productive process. Thus, the level of success achieved by each 
unit will depend on the volume of declarations, applications and 
8
communications that it is able to address, the discrepancies it is able to resolve 
and the number of cadastral valuations and inspections completed. To be able 
to achieve these results, each unit has a set of productive factors or inputs, 
notably human resources and physical capital. 
 
However, we should bear in mind that, in some cases, the activities 
assigned to cadastral officers are performed in collaboration with different public 
administrations, entities and/or corporations. This makes it essential to include 
information about those external processes in the evaluation in order to obtain 
measures that reflects appropriately the efficiency achieved by the cadastral 
offices. 
 
3.2. Database and variables 
 
Our dataset comprises information about 52 productive offices 
corresponding to regional administrative areas. Normally there is one office in 
each provincial capital although it is also possible for an office to be established 
in particular municipalities which have a sufficiently large population8. Although 
those units provide the cadastral services independently, they have a notable 
homogeneity both in the context of competences assigned and activities 
performed and also the tools used to accomplish them. This is essential for the 
analysis proposed.  
 
The variables representing the outputs and inputs of the productive 
process have been obtained from data from the Task Management Plan 
(activities), the System of Indices of Efficiency, Quality and Effectiveness and 
each organisation's Planned Objectives for the years between 2000 and 2005 
inclusively. 
 
The selection of indicators representative of output is not a simple task 
given the diversity of functions performed by the regional offices. In addition, we 
                                                 
8 Those municipalities are Cartagena, Gijón, Jerez de la Frontera and Vigo. The autonomous 
cities of Ceuta and Melilla also can be included within this category, whereas the offices 
operating in the foral regions of the Basque Country and Navarre are excluded of our analysis 
because there is not available information about their performance. 
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cannot include a high number of outputs, because it would imply the loss of 
discrimination power in DEA which may affect the results of the analysis. 
Therefore, we have opted for grouping the available information into a lower 
number of variables, following the guidelines established by the General 
Directorate. Following this principle, three output indicators were defined: 
 
a) CERENQ. This indicator represents the relationship between the 
cadastral units and population. It encompasses certifications issued 
(cadastral, graphic, alphanumeric, etc.) as well as all enquiries 
addressed. 
 
b) ALTER: The value includes the alterations to the cadastral database 
made directly by the offices themselves or indirectly by other (local) 
agents collaborating with cadastral offices to maintain and update the 
database. 
 
c) MODIF: The variable Incorporates the modifications and rectifications 
made as a result of correcting discrepancies between the description of 
properties and their actual situation. 
 
Regarding input factors, two variables were selected as representative of 
work and capital:  
 
a) EMPLOY: This indicator represents the weighted number of employees, 
since it adjusts the number of employees in accordance with their 
professional category9. 
 
b) CONTRACT: This variable represents current costs arising 
fundamentally from technical assistance contracts to keep the cadastral 
database updated which can be interpreted as a proxy of capital 
resources. These costs may be attributable to the offices themselves or 
                                                 
9 The employees working in each productive unit belong to different categories (senior 
management, middle management, administrative employees, etc.). In order to take into 
account those differences, the number of employees have been weighted according to the 
average remuneration of each group. 
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to central services. In the latter case, they have been attributed to the 
productive units benefitting from the relevant activities10. 
 
The production function derived from those variables involves a 
significant particularity that it is important to bear in mind and which is very 
useful in the evaluation of efficiency. If activities carried out on collaboration with 
local agents are included within the indicators representing the output of 
productive units, it is equally certain that the existence and extent of this 
collaboration favours those units in an efficiency evaluation by increasing the 
quantity of certain outputs. Consequently, in addition to considering the 
beneficial aspects of increases in output, we must take into account the cost of 
those collaborative activities. For this purpose, and following the guidelines of 
the General Directorate, we have considered collaboration between external 
agents and the productive units as a technical assistance contract with 
companies of the sector, thus increasing the amount of the relevant input 
(CONTRACT) at the market value of these activities. Moreover, this approach 
gives us the opportunity of evaluating in which extent that collaboration can 
affect the efficiency scores estimated. 
 
The principal descriptive statistics of input and output indicators in each 
of the years considered in this study are showed in Table 1.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The calculation is performed as if we are dealing with a technical assistance contract with 
companies from the sector, i.e., the value of the number of urban or rural units included in the 
cadastral databases is a result of new construction declarations and other modifications 
processed as part of the collaboration agreements. The average contract price was taken into 
account in determining the value. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of outputs and inputs 
 OUTPUTS INPUTS 
 CERENQ ALTCAD MODIF EMPLOY CONTRACT
2000      
Average 64,092 52,497 35,303 88.92 735,869
Dev. 39,521 65,459 37,510 58.14 633,701
Max. 218,910 368,058 214,295 294.26 2,704,420
Min. 3,773 2,761 257 16.41 1,002
2001   
Average 60,957 61,689 48,639 86.15 600,212
Dev. 32,477 73,150 115,305 56.22 656,802
Max. 137,459 411,033 816,725 282.31 3,701,640
Min. 3,485 3,378 168 15.02 2,336
2002   
Average 57,736 61,368 31,020 85.03 530,213
Dev. 34,425 73,930 39,272 53.81 613,994
Max. 181,011 374,441 224,477 278.45 4,043,993
Min. 5,020 3,652 260 12.80 1,302
2003   
Average 54,652 64,002 29,217 81.66 649,490
Dev. 32,514 76,972 43,399 51.04 799,228
Max. 159,465 391,443 272,051 292.16 4,799,113
Min. 4,123 3,776 393 15.26 16,292
2004   
Average 57,885 72,934 37,113 83.22 789,260
Dev. 37,099 85,866 63,038 50.23 867,117
Max. 214,652 455,084 338,632 273.50 5,398,833
Min. 5,190 3,403 251 13.48 7,887
2005   
Average 49,382 79,342 24,052 84.25 833,856
Dev. 30,919 89,538 29,245 50.53 844,234
Max. 185,406 454,963 163,147 280.05 4,904,381
Min. 3,197 3,499 333 13.43 16,656
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4. RESULTS 
 
This section presents the results obtained using the models described in 
the previous section. First, we estimate efficiency scores for each unit by 
applying a standard DEA. The model used has an input orientation due to the 
fact that cadastral offices' results do not depend directly on their own efforts but 
rather the extent of real estate activity in the area and applications made by 
property owners. Thus, potential improvements in terms of efficiency only can 
be achieved with a reduction in the use of inputs. Likewise, variable returns to 
scale are assumed in order to avoid possible inefficiencies associated with the 
size of offices. 
 
 As we have available data about the units for a period, we have been 
able to perform different analysis for each year, which allow us to draw more 
reliable conclusions than those derived from specific estimates from a single 
year. 
 
 The procedure followed was to calculate the efficiency scores for each 
year and, subsequently, the average for the period, which provides a sound 
approximation of the relative position of each unit during the period. Table 2 
summarises the average values of the efficiency scores and the number of 
efficient units for each year, together with the average values for the period. 
According to these data, the average efficiency during the period was around 
80%, although the value in different years varies between 70 and 83%. In the 
case of the average number of efficient units, this varies significantly from year 
to year, although the average value of efficient units during the period 
represents around 30% of the total units. 
 
Table 2. Average efficiency scores 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000-2005
Average Scores 0.8102 0.8255 0.8227 0.7577 0.7038 0.8301 0.7917 
Efficient units 18 16 16 13 12 17 15 
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But more interesting than the overall analysis of the units is the separate 
analysis of single units. Table 3 presents the efficiency scores for every unit in 
the sample in different years and the average for the period. Those values 
highlight the significant divergences among units. Thus, taking the average 
efficiency during the period as a reference point, we can notice that only four 
units achieved a unitary value on average (that is, only those that are efficient 
every year) while there are other units with average scores around 50%. 
 
Table 3. Efficiency scores of units in the period 
Unit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 2000-2005
Albacete 0.554 0.733 0.813 0.566 0.4612 0.640 0.628 
Alicante 0.901 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.0000 1.000 0.984 
Almería 0.725 0.801 0.760 0.825 0.656 0.864 0.772 
Ávila 0.785 1.000 1.000 0.743 0.492 0.835 0.809 
Badajoz 0.820 0.894 1.000 0.535 0.628 0.840 0.786 
Baleares 0.657 0.786 0.760 1.000 0.474 0.871 0.758 
Barcelona 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Burgos 0.516 0.679 0.659 0.481 0.455 0.740 0.588 
Cáceres 1.000 1.000 0.846 0.468 0.511 0.657 0.747 
Cádiz 0.737 0.904 0.772 1.000 0.770 0.750 0.822 
Cantabria 0.795 1.000 0.979 0.758 0.783 1.000 0.886 
Cartagena 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.891 0.982 
Castellón 0.792 0.705 0.925 0.961 0.914 1.000 0.883 
Ceuta 0.840 0.970 0.790 0.961 1.000 1.000 0.927 
Ciudad Real 1.000 0.796 0.821 0.728 0.581 0.786 0.785 
Córdoba 0.551 0.497 0.482 0.463 0.619 0.752 0.561 
Coruña (La) 0.534 0.622 0.642 0.867 0.522 0.881 0.678 
Cuenca 1.000 1.000 0.773 0.429 0.515 0.582 0.717 
Gerona 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Gijón 0.824 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.971 
Granada 0.477 0.609 0.602 0.561 0.625 0.778 0.609 
Guadalajara 0.781 0.811 0.839 0.658 0.571 0.705 0.727 
Huelva 0.858 0.771 0.681 0.636 0.522 0.875 0.724 
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Unit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 2000-2005
Huesca 0.602 0.488 0.501 0.430 0.393 0.478 0.482 
Jaén 0.861 0.669 0.808 1.000 0.705 0.679 0.787 
Jerez de la Frontera 0.618 0.552 0.517 0.550 1.000 1.000 0.706 
León 0.653 0.823 1.000 0.711 0.829 1.000 0.836 
Lérida 1.000 0.906 0.927 0.803 0.626 0.742 0.834 
Lugo 1.000 1.000 0.677 0.660 0.678 0.865 0.813 
Madrid 1.000 0.782 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.963 
Málaga 1.000 0.778 1.000 0.921 1.000 0.987 0.947 
Melilla 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Murcia 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.847 0.946 0.835 0.937 
Orense 0.580 0.836 0.782 0.536 0.501 0.715 0.658 
Oviedo 0.630 0.868 0.560 0.533 0.438 1.000 0.672 
Palencia 0.779 1.000 0.741 0.869 0.429 0.719 0.756 
Palmas (Las) 0.761 0.787 0.822 0.952 0.783 1.000 0.851 
Pontevedra 1.000 0.868 0.832 0.718 0.747 1.000 0.861 
Rioja (La) 0.741 0.789 0.896 0.688 0.552 0.800 0.744 
S. C. Tenerife 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Salamanca 0.795 0.663 0.747 0.580 0.686 0.787 0.710 
Segovia 0.709 0.624 0.660 0.676 0.582 0.717 0.661 
Sevilla 0.651 0.785 0.618 0.568 0.463 0.532 0.603 
Soria 1.000 0.734 0.751 0.588 0.520 0.665 0.709 
Tarragona 1.000 0.917 1.000 0.931 0.922 0.887 0.943 
Teruel 0.772 0.702 0.853 0.715 0.602 0.646 0.715 
Toledo 0.743 0.792 0.854 0.763 0.597 0.757 0.751 
Valencia 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.932 0.792 0.954 
Valladolid 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.855 0.548 1.000 0.901 
Vigo 0.895 0.982 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.979 
Zamora 0.644 0.527 0.609 0.486 0.450 0.643 0.560 
Zaragoza 0.546 0.472 0.483 0.370 0.561 0.467 0.483 
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The examination of specific cases enables us to identify units which have 
performed better or worse in different years. Notable amongst the former is the 
group composed of units classified as efficient in every single year (Barcelona, 
Gerona, Melilla and Santa Cruz de Tenerife) and other ones with average 
scores very close to one as they have been classified as efficient almost every 
year (Alicante, Cartagena, Gijón, Madrid, Málaga, Murcia, Tarragona, Valencia, 
Valladolid and Vigo). In contrast, Burgos, Córdoba, Huesca, Zamora and 
Zaragoza present values below 60% in almost every year.  
 
Most of units are placed between these two extremes, as they are 
considered as efficient some years while others they are placed below the 
frontier. Likewise, we can also observe that some offices have clearly improved 
their performance relative to others over the time period considered, since they 
present high levels of inefficiency during the first years and become efficient at 
the end of the period. This is the case with Ceuta or Jerez de la Frontera. In 
contrast, other units, such as Cáceres o Cuenca, have become inefficient after 
some years of being efficient. 
 
An exploratory analysis of the individual results of separate units reveals 
that, in general, offices sited in seaside provinces and those in provinces with 
higher levels of population are much more efficient than those in provinces with 
a lower population with the sole exception of Zaragoza. In order to test whether 
this perception has a statistical basis we perform a second stage analysis on 
the results of the efficiency analysis so that we can examine the possible impact 
of external variables not included in the initial evaluation. 
 
For that purpose, we have considered three environmental variables that 
provide information about different aspects of the province where each 
cadastral office is situated and we consider that may be related to their volume 
of activities11. In addition, as we are interested in determining whether the 
collaboration with other public sector agents can affect the levels of efficiency 
achieved by cadastral offices, we have also considered another variable that 
                                                 
11 The information on these variables was obtained from different databases compiled by the 
National Institute of Statistics. 
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represent the proportion of activities carried out by those agents12. Therefore, 
we have considered the following external variables: 
 
? Population: Total population. 
? GVA: Gross Value Added as an indicator of economic activity. 
? Construction: Percentage of GVA represented by construction 
activities. 
? External Agents: Percentage of activities carried out by collaborating 
agents. 
 
The first three variables are associated with higher levels of demand in 
the sense that it could be expected that cadastral units sited in provinces with a 
higher population, higher levels of economic activity and, specifically, in the 
construction sector, require more cadastral services which could lead to higher 
efficiency scores13. Regarding the variable that represents the level of 
collaboration with other public sector units, its potential effect on improving 
efficiency (even if the cost of "purchasing" the service is charged as an external 
cost) come from the fact that decentralized units (councils and notaries) have at 
their disposal more detailed information about properties14. 
  
 In the estimation of the Tobit regressions we have used panel data 
(Maddala, 1987) with the aim of modelling appropriately the heterogeneity 
detected in the initial evaluation, both across units and over the six years 
studied15. Subsequently, in order to avoid possible problems of bias in the 
results, Algorithm 1 developed by Simar and Wilson (2007) is applied with an 
                                                 
12 Data about these activities were provided by the General Directorate. 
13 In fact, all these variables present significant and positive correlation coefficients with different 
output indicators. 
14 There is a profuse literature about external contracting or outsourcing in the public sector 
(either with private companies or with other public sector organisations) and its effect on 
efficiency assessment, since that collaboration can lead to reduce costs. See, for example, 
Jensen and Stonecash (2004) or Jensen (2005). 
15 Using panel data implies that there is a transversal dimension, which is observed for a 
specific period of time (2000-2005 in our study), which also bestows a temporal dimension to 
the dataset. 
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adaptation for the particular context of panel data16. Tables 4 and 5 show the 
results of the different estimations. 
 
Table 4. Tobit regression results 
Dependent variable: Initial efficiency scores 
Estimation Method: Panel Tobit 
Sample: 2000 2005 
Periods included: 6 
Cross Section Units: 52 
Total Observations in Panel: 312 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t p-value 
Population 0.004472 0.001013 4.413568 0.0000
Construction 0.000031 0.000006 5.478987 0.0000
Gross Value Added 0.000024 0.000005 5.030307 0.0000
External Agents (%) 0.130349 0.047247 2.758869 0.0058
 
 
Table 5. Results obtained with model proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007)17 
Dependent variable: Initial efficiency scores 
Estimation Method: Panel Tobit 
Sample: 2000 2005 
Periods included: 6 
Cross Section Units: 52 
Total Observations in Panel: 312 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t p-value 
Population 0.004193 0.000923 4.542795 0.0000
Construction 0.000028 0.000005 5.723837 0.0000
Gross Value Added 0.000022 0.000006 4.763123 0.0000
External Agents (%) 0.118512 0.045392 2.610856 0.0055
                                                 
16 According to the authors, Algorithm 1 offers better results than Algorithm 2 when the sample 
size is relatively small as in our case. 
17 The results shown in this Table represent the average values obtained after estimating 2,000 
iterations using the Algorithm 1 proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). 
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 These results, in addition to confirming our perception, highlight some 
interesting issues. Firstly, the estimated parameters do not vary significantly 
between the standard Tobit and the application of the Simar and Wilson (2007) 
model as is usually the case when their Algorithm 1 is used18. Secondly, 
although all the variables related to demand side pressure (population and the 
general and specific added value of construction) have a positive and significant 
effect on efficiency, the low values of their parameters denote that the effect is 
extremely limited. In contrast, the variable representing the percentage of 
activities managed by collaborating agents present higher values of parameters, 
which are also significant and positive. This result seems to confirm that sharing 
responsibilities in the management of cadastral services (at current levels of 
collaboration) has a positive effect on the performance of units. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study examines the performance of units providing cadastral 
services in Spain using an approach based on efficiency. For this purpose, we 
have used Data Envelopment Analysis since this technique can easily be 
adapted to this context. The dataset used in this application, provided by the 
General Directorate of Real Estate Evaluation, comprises information about 52 
cadastral offices in Spain during the inclusive period 2000-2005.  
 
The results obtained in the study reveal significant differences between 
average levels and the identification of efficient units throughout the period 
under consideration. However, two groups of offices stand out from the rest 
both in positive (high and even unitary values in all years) and negative terms 
(values below 60% in most of years). 
 
These results must be analysed quite cautiously as the values obtained 
with this methodology are highly sensitive to potential data errors, random 
shocks or the effect of factors that have not been taken into account in the 
                                                 
18 The results obtained by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) and Cordero et al (2009) confirm this 
trend. 
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analysis because they are outside the control of the units evaluated. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that the possibility of having panel data at our 
disposal, which is not frequent in most of efficiency studies, makes it possible to 
conduct a separate analysis for each year, reinforcing the robustness of results.  
 
The results obtained in a second stage analysis in which the potential 
influence of different external variables on efficiency is tested lead us to 
conclude that demographic and economic variables have little or no effect on 
efficiency. This fact reinforces the validity of estimated values which do not 
need to be corrected to take into account the effect of those exogenous 
variables. In contrast, the collaboration with public sector agents has a positive 
effect on efficiency levels. This result points out a simple way of achieving 
improvements in the management of this service. 
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